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Abstract
Sharia banking industry in Indonesia has been established since early 1990s and
growing remarkably after 1998. How the industry contributed to the Indonesian
economy and what shocks drove the sharia banks’ financing in Indonesia were inves-
tigated in this paper using a Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) model with
recursive short run restrictions as its identification strategy. The results showed
that GDP growth, core inflation, and business activity responded to increase in
sharia banks’ financing positively, but with lags. Expanding sharia financing by 1
per cent boosted up GDP growth by 0.06 per cent. In the short-run, the contribu-
tion of sharia banks’ financing to the macroeconomic variables was limited, but it
then escalated in the long run with the main channel of transmission through its
ability to drive people’s purchasing power. Another result showed that sharia banks’
financing had a negative relationship with the central bank’s monetary policy. In
order to improve the performance of sharia banking in Indonesia, the demands of
domestic sharia financing have to be strengthened with regards to the large number
of Moslems in Indonesia. At the same time, Islamic banks have to improve their
business processes. Rather than capping their profit margins or murabahah-based
financing, they should promote more profit sharing mudharabah-based financing
with prioritizing principle of mutual help among Moslems.
Keywords: Sharia banks’ financing, Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR),
macroeconomic variables, shock
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1 Introduction
Islamic finance has grown rapidly in recent years. By the end of 2014, the total assets
of Islamic finance accounted for approximately USD 2 trillion worldwide with the aver-
age annual growth rate of 17.5 per cent between 2009 and 2013 (Ernst Young, 2015).
Indonesia and Turkey experienced the highest growth rate of about 43 per cent and 19
per cent respectively within the same period (Hussain, Shahmoradi, & Turk, 2015).
In the longer horizon periods of time, the number of Islamic financial institutions had
grown from just one institution in 1975 to over 410 institutions globally by the end of
2013 (Elmawazini, Khiyar, & Galfy, 2015; Hussain et al., 2015). Similar to this trend,
the number of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia had also increased considerably
from merely one in 1991 to 13 of sharia commercial banks and 21 of sharia business unit
owned by conventional banks by the end of 2016. With such notable growth, how the
impact of sharia banking on economic growth is appealing to study.
On the one hand, sharia banking is claimed to be more resilient to shocks due to its
characteristics. Two important features of sharia banking that make it conceptually more
advantageous than conventional banking are its limited engagements in speculative trans-
actions and risk-sharing balance sheets (International Monetary Fund, 2017). In sharia
banking risk-sharing concept, sharia banks are funded mainly by non-interest-bearing
current accounts as well as risk and return sharing of investment account. Meanwhile,
in conventional banking risk transfer concept, banks take all the risks by assuring a pre-
specified return and guaranteeing deposits. Goaied and Sassi (2010) also highlight that
sharia banking has a better economic stability compared to conventional banking. They
argue that in case of bank-specific or macroeconomic crises, investment depositors of
sharia banks share the risks automatically and this will allow the liability adjustments.
This study aims to investigate two questions. First, it explores to find out whether
the sharia banking in Indonesia contributes to the economic growth of Indonesia both
in the short- and the long-run. Second, it attempts to find out whether macroeconomic
dynamics have impacts on the sharia banking development in Indonesia. Furthermore,
this paper argues that as part of the overall financial system, sharia banking is not immune
to either domestic macroeconomic shocks or external shocks from abroad, particularly
through monetary policy and exchange rate shocks.
The result of this study is expected to contribute to the existing literature on Islamic
finance. First, it presents two-way impact analysis of sharia banking development and
macroeconomic variables. It also underlines the importance of monetary policy shocks
to the development of sharia banking with underlying assumption consistent with the
standard macroeconomic theory of monetary policy in which monetary policy shocks
cannot have instantaneous impact on macroeconomic variables, such as GDP and infla-
tion. Lastly, this study offers some empirical analysis on the elasticity of sharia banking
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development against macroeconomic shocks.
The rest of this paper is structured into four sections. Section II provides a brief
literature review on the relationship between financial sector and economic growth, and it
also discusses the previous studies regarding the impact of sharia banking on the economic
development. Section III presents the methodology including theoretical framework, data
collection and model specification. Meanwhile, the results and discussion of the analysis
are presented in Section IV afterwards; and it is finally followed by Section V which
summarizes and concludes the study.
2 Literature Review
It is generally believed that financial sector has an important role in promoting economic
growth of a country. This sector is able to do so if it can direct financial resources to the
whole economy. On the other hand, what happens with the macroeconomic variables also
influences the development of financial sector. Hence, there are three possibilities of rela-
tionships between financial sector development and the macroeconomy: (i) development
of financial sector determines economic growth -”supply leading”; (ii) economic growth
determines development of financial sector -”demand following”; and, (iii) both have bidi-
rectional causation (Furqani & Mulyany, 2009). Investigations to those relationships
end up with mixed results. Some of them support ”demand following” theory (Furqani
& Mulyany, 2009; Masih & Masih, 1996), some other results take the ”supply leading”
theory (Fase & Abma, 2003; Xu, 2000), and the rest found that financial development
would not even promote growth (Galindo & Micco, 2004; Harris, 1997).
As part of the financial sector, Islamic banking or sharia banking should have the same
nexus with macro-economic development. A number of studies have been conducted to
research this relationship. Furqani and Mulyany (2009) examined relationships between
sharia banking and economic growth in Malaysia using a Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM). They find that increase in GDP initiates sharia banking to develop, but no
evidence that sharia banking supports GDP growth. In other research, Kassim et.al.
(2009) examined the effect of monetary policy shocks on both sharia and conventional
banks in Malaysia in a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) framework. They found that the
sharia banking was more sensitive to the monetary shocks compared to the conventional
banking. One drawback of their research is the strong assumption by putting overnight
rate variable, monetary policy instrument, at the first order in the Cholesky ordering they
apply on their model. By this order, monetary policy is treated more exogenous than
the other macroeconomic variables such as industrial production, inflation, and exchange
rate in their model. As a result, their monetary shocks may be over-estimated. This is
also inconsistent with a number of studies which find that monetary policy shocks cannot
have instantaneous impact on some macroeconomic variables, like GDP and inflation
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(Clarida, Gali, & Gertler, 1998; Estrella, 2015; Peersman, 2005; Uhlig, 2005).
In Indonesia, sharia banking industry has been established since early 1990s with
Bank Muamalat Indonesia as the pioneer (Ascarya & Yumanita, 2005). Starting in
1992, the Indonesian Government has been committed to support the development of
sharia banking in Indonesia, but the Government did not give more commitment with
greater supports until 1998. Before 1998, operation of the sharia banking in Indonesia
was under Law no. 7 of 1992 which introduced dual banking system (Ascarya &
Yumanita, 2005). Although sharia banking was not mentioned explicitly in the law, it
in fact regulated about business with profit sharing system. Under the law, sharia banks
still met difficulties regarding the operational procedures for sharia transactions. What
was understood at that time was that sharia banking operated with profit sharing system,
but they still complied with conventional banking regulations.
In 1998, the Government started to be fully committed in supporting sharia banking
in Indonesia by amending Law no. 14 of 1967 on Banking Principles with Law no. 10 of
1998. This new law was enacted with both institutional and operational fundamentals for
comprehensive development of sharia banking in Indonesia (Ascarya & Yumanita, 2005).
Under this law, dual banking system has been fully adopted with both the conventional
and the sharia banking under the surveillance of the central bank, Bank of Indonesia.
Still under the new law, conventional banks were allowed to operate sharia business units.
Amendment of Law no. 13 of 1968 with Law no. 23 of 1999 on Bank of Indonesia has
strengthened the existence of sharia banking in Indonesia. A number of sharia business
units have grown enormously thereafter.
In terms of assets and third-party funds, sharia banks have improved remarkably.
Sharia banks’ assets grew from IDR 7.9 trillion in December 2003 to IDR14.2 trillion in
November 2004 or increased by 79.75 per cent. As a comparison, overall banks assets
only grew by 13.4 per cent within the same period (Ascarya & Yumanita, 2005). In
2016, the amount of sharia banks asset was IDR 356.5 trillion, so between 2004 and 2016
their asset rose by 2,411 per cent or 201 per cent per annum within the period of 14
years. Contribution of sharia banks’ asset to the total asset of banks was accounted for
1.11 per cent per November 2004 and it became 5.33 per cent per November 2016. On
the other hand, third-party funds of the sharia banks contributed to 0.64 per cent of total
banks’ third-party funds in 2003 and it became 4.35 per cent in 2016 (Indonesia Banking
Statistics, 2017). As the sharia banking has been growing considerably, its contribution
to the Indonesian economy should have increased accordingly.
A number of studies regarding the relationship between sharia banking dynamics and
macroeconomic responses have been done previously. One among others was the study of
Abduh and Omar (2012) which reported that Islamic financial development in Indonesia
had a significant relationship with the Indonesian economic growth both in short run
and long run periods. Another research of Abduh et. al. (2012) argued that Islamic
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financial deepening in Bahrain demonstrated a significant positive relationship too with
the Bahrain’s economic growth, but only in the long run. Al-Oqool et. al. (2014) found
a similar evidence in a case study of Jordan. Furthermore, Boukhatem and Moussa
(2018) concluded that Islamic financial development stimulated the economic growth of
Middle East and North African countries, although stalled by the immature institutional
framework. In their study, they already used multiple control variables, namely conven-
tional and Islamic banking system activity, real GDP per capita, inflation, education,
government consumption expenditure, trade openness, and quality of institutions.
Most of the previous studies, however, do not reckon key macroeconomic variables like
GDP, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates simultaneously. Sharia banking should
be affected by either domestic macroeconomic shocks or external shocks from abroad,
particularly monetary policy shock and exchange rate shock. These two influential shocks
were missing in the previous studies. Moreover, some studies like Kassim et.al. (2009)
treat monetary policy variable too exogenous. They set overnight interest rate variable
more exogenous than the other macroeconomic variables, such as industrial production,
inflation, and exchange rate in their model. As a result, their monetary shocks may
be over-estimated. The existing belief that sharia banking is more resilient to economic
shocks is also still underexplored.
3 Methodology
3.1 Theoretical Framework
Regardless the debate which comes first between financial development and economic
growth, financial intermediaries, either conventional or sharia, are favorable for economic
growth. They are able to promote growth through five functions: (i) allocating resources;
(ii) organizing savings; (iii) helping goods and services exchange; (iv) exercising corporate
control and monitor managers; and, (v) facilitating investment activities and risk pooling
(Levine, 1997). Through those functions, financial intermediaries take on the transaction
costs and develop resource allocation which then have an effect on saving rates and
investments (Imam & Kpodar, 2016). The saving rates and investments subsequently
influence the economic growth as well as the economic activity.
According to the capital structure irrelevance theory, the cost of capital is not inde-
pendent to capital structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). By this meaning, in the event
of sharia and conventional banking finance common projects, they will have indistinctive
effects to the economy as their capital structures are alike. However, Imam and Kpodar
(2016) identify that sharia banks have unique features and more advantages compared to
the conventional banks. First, sharia banks offer risk-sharing attributes implying that it
can encourage financing to individuals without underlying assets or collaterals. For cor-
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porates or businesses, financial capital providers and business owners share risks together
with profits. Second, sharia banks raises savings as devoted muslims are not willing to
put their money into the conventional banks which are against their religious principles.
Sharia banks can attract their money to the financial system so that financial intermedi-
ation improves. Third, the risk-sharing concepts of sharia banking have made the sharia
banks less prone to financial crisis. Also, they do not have asset-liability mismatches,
as short-term needs are financed by short-term deposits and long-term investment is fi-
nanced by long-term deposits. Fourth, sharia banks finance projects which are morally
acceptable so as to unhazardous for society, for instance, the sharia banks will not finance
a casino.
Nonetheless, sharia banking also have some disadvantages compared to the conven-
tional banking, namely lack of economies of scale and lack of liquid instruments (Imam
& Kpodar, 2016). In terms of economies of scale, sharia banks tend to be newer and
smaller than conventional banks, which makes their cost structures higher. Also, due to
its younger age, their instruments are less developed and therefore less liquid compared
to the conventional instruments.
3.2 Data Collection
This study used secondary data collected from Central Bureau of Statistics, Bank of
Indonesia, and Indonesia’s Financial Services Authority. The data was a quarterly data
with sample period of 2005q3 to 2017q1 (47 observations). Table 1 shows the data
description.
No Variable Unit Description Source
1 GDP IDR billion s.a. X12 BPS
2 Core consumer price index Index 2010=100 s.a. X12 BPS
3 Money market rate Per cent p.a. s.a. X12 BI
4 Real effective exchange rate Index 2010=100 s.a. X12 BI
5 Business activity weighted net balance Per cent s.a. X12 BI
6 Sharia banks financing IDR billion s.a. X12 OJK
Table 1: Data sources
Unit roots tests of the raw data and constructed variables were performed using
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron tests. The results showed that
all raw data were integrated processes of order one (I (1)) at 1 per cent significance
level, except money market rate which was I (0) at 5 per cent significance level. After
constructions, all were I (0) or stationary.
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3.3 Model Specification
In order to formulate the dynamic relationship between sharia banking and macroe-
conomic variables, a Structural Vector Autoregression Regression (SVAR) model was
adopted in this study with structure as follows:
Y t = c+
n∑
i=1
AiY t−i +Bεt (1)
where Y t consists of GDP (yt), core consumer price index (pt), money market rate (rt),
real effective exchange rate (reert), business condition (bust) and sharia banks’ financ-
ing (fint) in order. GDP is chosen to reflect aggregate supply shock in the Indonesian
economy, while core consumer price index is to capture aggregate demand shock. Core
consumer price index is preferred to overall consumer price index in order to eliminate
effects of volatile foods and administered prices since they do not mirror people’s purchas-
ing power. Meanwhile, money market rate is chosen to be put in the model to capture
overall monetary condition in Indonesia which is believed to have significant influence to
the banking financing including sharia financing. It is also believed that exchange rate as
well as business environment have noteworthy impacts to the sharia banking financing.
Positive numbers of the business condition indices show business’ expansion, conversely
negative numbers indicate business’ contraction.
All variables are expressed in percentage log return form except for the money market
rate and business condition as they are already in percentage. Those variables other
than money market rate dan business condition enter in log-differenced forms with a
number of considerations. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, Ashley and Verbrugge (2009)
investigate the question of ’to difference or not to difference’ in vector autoregression
models exploiting a range of estimation techniques. The simulation results then suggest
that estimating a VAR model in levels can be problematic to perform statistical inference,
such as Granger causality testing and the results may be spurious. Conversely, VAR in
differences estimation method yields high power causality tests. Moreover, their results
also suggest that in terms of impulse response functions, VAR model in levels indeed
yields impulse response function confidence interval converging more properly. However,
VAR model in differences still yield appropriate impulse response function confidence
intervals when the sample size is small. In their study, they use number of observations
of 50, 200, 400 and 2000, while this paper uses 47 observations.
In equation (1), c is a (n × 1) matrix of deterministic component which is constant
and exogenous. Ai contains autoregressive coefficients of (n× n) matrix and εt is vector
of mutually and serially uncorrelated structural disturbances. In sum, the full set of
constructed endogenous variables is
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Y t = {100∆ln (yt) , 100∆ln (pt) , rt,100∆ln (reert) , bust, 100∆ln (fint)
(2)
Considering the number of quarterly observations and to preserve the degrees of free-
dom, the SVAR model is estimated using two lags. Likelihood Ratio (LR) and Final
Prediction Error (FPE) also suggest two lags to be used. The model estimated has satis-
fied the stability condition. Under the model structure, six principal shocks identified are
supply shock (εs), demand shock (εd), monetary shock (εm), exchange rate shock (εer),
business shock (εb), and sharia money demand shock (εsmd).
ε
′
t
=
[
εs, εd, εm, εer, εb, εsmd
]
(3)
One important thing in a VAR model is the identification (Inoue & Kilian, 2013;
Kilian, 1998; Martin, Hurn, & Harris, 2012). In general, the identification strategies
in the VAR model can be divided into four, namely: (i) short-run restrictions; (ii) long-
run restrictions; (iii) a combination of the short- and the long-run restrictions; and, (iv)
sign restrictions (Martin et al., 2012). Some studies that use short-run restrictions are
conducted by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) studying monetary policy shocks,
Kilian (2009) investigating the impact of oil price shocks, Kim & Roubini (2000) finding
out the exchange rate anomalies in industrial countries, and Mansur (2015) studying the
impact of oil price shocks on Indonesia. Meanwhile, some researches using the long-run
restrictions are conducted by Blanchard & Quah (1989) studying demand and supply
shocks, and by Fry, Hocking, Martin (2008) and Mansur, Liu, & Zaman (2015) studying
the role of portfolio shocks to the Australian economy.
Studies using a combination of the short- and the long-run restrictions were then
carried out by Gali (1992) who studies IS-LM model and Peersman (2005) who models
the oil price shocks. Finally, the sign restrictions are used in studies, for instance, by
Baumeister & Kilian (2014), Dungey & Fry (2009) and Uhlig (2005).
In this study the identification strategy of short-run restrictions is used with the re-
cursive ordering or known as Cholesky ordering. It was firstly proposed by Wold (1951)
as an identification method of structural equation parameters. This Cholesky-recursive
identification is recommended to be considered first and asked if there is something un-
reasonable (Ouliaris, Pagan, & Restrepo, 2016). If the ordering can be justified on
economic grounds, then the Cholesky identification is appropriate (Kilian & Ltkepohl,
2017). The Cholesky ordering applied in the model used in this paper is GDP (yt), core
consumer price index (pt), money market rate (rt), real effective exchange rate (reert),
business condition (bust), and sharia banks’ financing (fint) respectively. By this order,
it assumes that a shock in the GDP has an instant effect on the other variables, while
8
a shock in the core consumer price index, for example, has an impact to the GDP with
some lags. As an instance, when there are capital inflows, GDP rises quickly and rel-
ative price of consumption drops in consequence of interest rate’s hike as a monetary
policy adjustment. On the other hand, let’s say there are capital inflows, real exchange
rate appreciates before it finally affects trade balance and GDP after some time. REER
therefore does not have immediate effect on the GDP, core consumer price, and money
market rate. Variable of sharia banks’ financing is put in the last order as it will not
affect macroeconomic variables instantaneously, but it needs some time to have effects.
In a matrix form, the reduced-form errors which are decomposed according to et = Bεt
as in equation (1) under Cholesky-recursive decomposition can be written as follows:
et ≡


egdpt
ecore cpit
emoney market ratet
ereert
ebusiness conditiont
esharia financingt


=


a11 0 0 0 0 0
a21 a22 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 a33 0 0 0
a41 a42 a43 a44 0 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 a55 0
a61 a62 a63 a64 a65 a66




ε
supply
t
εdemandt
ε
monetary
t
ε
exchange rate
t
εbusinesst
ε
sharia money demand
t


(4)
After estimating the parameters of structural reduced-form errors, the analysis of
results is then conducted through impulse responses and variance as well as historical
decompositions. The impulse responses are found from the MA form zt = D(L)et where
et are decomposed based on et = Bεt and D are generated recursively according to the
B matrix. Whilst variance and historical decompositions decompose one shock versus
others using the impulse responses.
4 Results and Discussion
This section discusses the results of the study comprising Impulse Responses, Variance
Decompositions, and Historical Decompositions.
4.1 Impulse Responses
In this subsection, Figure 1 depicts responses of macroeconomic variables to sharia banks’
financing shock, reported for 30 quarters, while Figure 2 shows responses of sharia banks’
financing to macroeconomic shocks, reported for 30 quarters. The responses were based
on traditional short run restrictions with Cholesky ordering.
As shown in Figure 1, the sharia money demand shock was indicated by 2.7 per cent
increase of sharia financing in the first quarter. All macroeconomic variables react with
lags or they did not respond to this shock immediately. It was consistent with the logic
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that financing needs some time to be transmitted to the real economy. GDP growth, core
inflation, and business activity responded positively due to the sharia banks’ financing
shock. Expanding sharia financing boosts up GDP growth by 0.15 per cent in Quarter
2 and reaches the peak of 0.21 per cent in Quarter 3 before the impact vanishes in the
beginning of Quarter 4. Similar story happened on the response of business activity due
to the sharia banks’ financing shock. Expanding sharia financing by 2.7 per cent drives
the business activity to expand by 0.23 per cent in quarter 2, peaking up to 0.45 per cent
in Quarter 3 and then the effect fades away since Quarter 4. In other words, one per cent
increase of sharia financing soars business activity by 0.09 per cent in one quarter and it
multiplies up to 0.17 per cent in the next quarter.
Figure 1: Responses of macroeconomic variables to sharia banks financing shock ± 1
standard deviation
In terms of response of people’s purchasing power which was represented by core
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inflation, the impact of sharia banks’ financing shock took a longer time to be transmitted
to drive the peoples purchasing power. A 2.7 per cent increase of sharia financing in the
first quarter was followed by an increase of core inflation by 0.03 per cent in Quarter 3
and attains its peak of 0.06 per cent in Quarter 6 before the effect evaporates thereafter.
Following the rise of core inflation, monetary policy responses with tightening interest
rate after some periods. Another dimension of the results from the estimated model
which became another main focus in this paper was how the sharia banking financing
responded or reacted due to an unanticipated structural shock of each macroeconomic
variable. These are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Responses of sharia banks’ financing to macroeconomic shocks ± 1 standard
deviation
As shown in top left of Figure 2, attributable to an unanticipated supply shock in-
dicated by 1.56 per cent increase of GDP growth in Quarter 1, sharia banks’ financing
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growth rises promptly by just below 1 per cent in the same quarter. It then reaches the
peak of 1.28 per cent in Quarter 2 before fading away after Quarter 7. By those numbers,
it can also be said that the elasticity of sharia banks’ financing to GDP is about 0.6 0.8.
In other words, if GDP grows by 5 per cent, sharia banks’ financing may expand by 3 to
4 per cent to the maximum.
Different story happens on the response of sharia banks’ financing to an unanticipated
demand shock as shown in top right of Figure 2. The unanticipated demand shock is
indicated by 0.25 per cent increase of core CPI in Quarter 1. Accordingly, sharia banks’
financing growth falls by 1.03 per cent in the same quarter. This result is somewhat
puzzled since banks’ financing should have positive correlation with people’s purchasing
power. Improving people’s purchasing power should be followed by expanding financing
or growing demand for financing. In order to investigate more, another specification of
the same model is run by replacing variable of sharia banks’ financing with conventional
banks’ credit. The results show that conventional banks’ credit responds positively due
to an unanticipated positive demand shock . This finding implies that there is possi-
bility of shifting consumer’s preference to type of banks’ credit. Consumer seems to
prefer conventional credit to sharia financing under more accommodative macroeconomic
environment. It also indicates that it is challenging for sharia banks to compete with
conventional banks. However, a positive response of sharia banks’ financing due to an
unanticipated positive demand shock still appears in Quarter 2 by 0.72 per cent which is
also the highest impact.
Similar with response of sharia banks’ financing to an unanticipated demand shock,
response of sharia banks’ financing to a business activity shock is also negative in Quarter
1 and then it turns into positive in Quarter 2. Again, this result is somewhat puzzled
since banks’ financing should have positive correlation with business activity. To in-
vestigate more, the other specification of the same model is run once more by replacing
variable of sharia banks’ financing with conventional banks’ credit. The results show that
conventional banks’ credit responds positively to business activity. Again, this finding
shows that business or industry seems to prefer conventional credit rather than sharia
financing under more accommodative macroeconomic environment. However, positive
response of sharia banks’ financing is still seen in Quarter 2. As much as 2.57 per cent
growth of business activity in Quarter 1 is followed by 1.43 per cent increase of sharia
banks’ financing in Quarter 2.
Figure 2 (row 2) indicates the response of sharia banks’ financing to a monetary shock
and exchange rate shock. It responds negatively due to a monetary shock. In contrast,
it responds positively due to an exchange rate shock. As a result of an unanticipated
monetary shock indicated by 0.61 per cent surge of money market rate in Quarter 1,
sharia banks’ financing tightens by 1.04 per cent in the same quarter and it lasts for at
least five quarters. This result is consistent with what happens in Malaysia (Kassim,
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Majid, & Yusof, 2009). A rationale of this finding is that consumers do not want to
lock-in their loans commitment during high interest rate regime. Besides, this significant
negative relationship is almost the same with the relationship between conventional banks
and monetary policy at which a tightening monetary policy is followed by the decreasing
credit of conventional banks. This finding shows that the sharia and the conventional
banks share the same business process which results in a very similar behavior. It makes
sense since the sharia banks’ financing are dominated by murabahah-based financing or
capped to the profit margins, which is similar to the conventional banks’ interest rates. In
contrast, it is also somewhat consistent with the small portion of profit sharing financing
mudharabah-based out of the total sharia financing in Indonesia. The proportion of
mudharabah-based financing to the total financing was accounted for approximately 38
per cent as of March 2017.
To support this argument further, series of sharia banks’ financing and conventional
banks’ credits were tested in order to check their correlations. The test result showed
that both series correlated by 43.30 per cent with t-statistic value of 3.19 and p-value
of 0.0026. In other words, their correlations were significant at 1 per cent level. Since a
number of sharia banks’ in Indonesia are subsidiaries of Indonesian conventional banks,
this finding is consistent with findings of Salleh et. al. (2018) who reported that Islamic
subsidiaries of conventional banks in Malaysia have significant positive impacts on their
Net Profit Margin (NPM).
4.2 Analyzing Puzzles and Robustness Check
It may be the case in doing SVAR that some puzzles show up, e.g., a prize puzzle where
prices go up in response to a monetary policy shock or an output puzzle in which output
increases in responding to a monetary policy shock. Another puzzle that may come
up is an exchange rate puzzle where exchange rate depreciates following a monetary
policy tightening. To ensure the validity of the model used in this paper, those puzzles
are investigated through the respected impulse responses results. Figure 3 shows that
a tightening monetary policy signified by an increase in interest rate is followed by a
significant falling core inflation and REER appreciation; whereas the response of output
to the tightening monetary policy is considered insignificant. All these results are as
expected or in other words, the puzzles do not exist.
If the puzzles either a price puzzle or output puzzle come up, a number of studies have
proposed some alternatives for remedies. Sims (1992) suggests inclusion of commodity
price to get rid of the puzzles, while Giordani (2004) recommends replacing variable of
output with output gap. In a more recent paper, Fry, Hocking and Martin (2008) find
that the source of the price puzzle is due to misidentification of aggregate demand shocks
as monetary shocks. So, the remedy proposed by the later is to correctly identify the
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aggregate demand as well as monetary shocks.
Figure 3: Responses of Core Inflation, Output, REER and Interest Rate to a Monetary
Shock ± 1 standard deviation
To check the robustness of the model further, a different specification is estimated by
reordering the variables as GDP (yt), business condition (bust), core consumer price index
(pt), money market rate (rt), sharia banks financing (fint) and real effective exchange
rate (reert) respectively. By this order, it assumes that exchange rate absorbs all the
shocks within the economy. The results show similar results as in Figure 1 and 2. There
is only an insignificant difference in magnitudes of responses, but the directions do not
change. Moreover, the puzzles do not appear either as shown in Figure 4.
In this subsection, a non-recursive identification is not used for robustness checking
because non-recursively identified VAR models more closely bear a resemblance to tra-
ditional simultaneous equation models (Kilian & Lutkepohl, 2017). They point out
that with the similar structures, it implies that non-recursively identified VAR models
are also susceptible to the weakness of simultaneous equation models, such as the likely
appearance of liquidity effect. The liquidity effect is known where interest rates respond
positively to innovations in monetary aggregates (for example M0, M1 and M2) (Kim &
Roubini, 2000). To avoid this risk, this paper still considers a recursively identified VAR
model for robustness checking.
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Figure 4: Responses of Core Inflation, Output, REER and Interest Rate to a Monetary
Shock ± 1 standard deviation
4.3 Variance Decomposition
The biggest contribution of sharia banks’ financing is through its ability to drive people’s
purchasing power. Although it is a small number, still, it is higher than the shared contri-
bution to the GDP growth directly. In the short-run, sharia banks’ financing contributes
to 1.73 per cent of people’s purchasing power, represented by core inflation in the model.
In the long-run, its contribution rises significantly up to just below 10 per cent. This
is also consistent with the fact that consumption financing dominates the overall sharia
financing. According to the sharia banking statistics data published by the Indonesian
Financial Services Authority as of March 2017, from the total of sharia banks’ financing,
41.72 per cent was for consumption, 34.20 per cent for working capital, and 24.07 per
cent for investment.
Additionally, sharia banks’ financing also contributes to the monetary policy deter-
mination in the long run, as part of overall banks’ credit and financing to the economy,
with an amount of about 6 per cent. However, there is no contribution of sharia banks’
financing to the monetary policy in short run.
Table 3 presents the shocks that determine sharia banks’ financing both in the short-
and the long-run. In the short-run, the shock of sharia financing itself and the exchange
rate shock dominate sharia banks’ financing with shared contribution of 51.60 per cent
and 20.21 per cent respectively. It is quite normal that sharia banks’ financing highly
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Quarter
GDP
growth
Core
inflation
Interest
rate
Exchange
rate
Business
activity
Sharia
financing
1 - - - - - 51.60
2 0.70 0.00 0.01 0.71 0.37 39.18
4 2.67 1.73 0.16 1.59 2.08 37.98
12 5.49 9.19 4.20 2.32 2.36 37.72
40 5.98 9.89 6.02 2.33 2.49 37.68
Table 2: Variance Decomposition: Contribution of Sharia Financing Shock to Macro-
Economy (in per cent)
Quarter
Supply
shock
Demand
shock
Monetary
shock
Exchange
rate
shock
Business
shock
Sharia
financing
shock
1 6.79 7.37 7.58 20.21 6.44 51.60
2 12.19 7.33 8.49 18.98 13.84 39.18
4 13.93 9.00 9.83 18.18 11.09 37.98
12 14.66 10.93 9.41 16.42 10.86 37.72
40 14.65 10.97 9.41 16.40 10.89 37.68
Table 3: Variance Decomposition of Sharia Banks (in per cent)
depends on financing demand, while the significant contribution of exchange rate shock
reveals that sharia banks are not invulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations since exchange
rate performance is generally associated with level of confidence of a country due to global
shocks, such as capital flows.
The next significant shock which influences sharia banks’ financing in the short-run is
the monetary shock with contribution of 7.58 per cent. This number is even higher than
the contributions of demand, supply, and business shocks. It confirms the previous result
of impulse response of sharia banks’ financing to monetary policy. In other words, sharia
banks’ financing in Indonesia is not inelastic to the monetary policy changes, similar to
sharia banks’ financing in Malaysia which is also unaffected by their monetary policy
rate changes. Again, the sharia banks’ margin looks capped to the conventional banks’
interest rates.
In the long-run, aside from the contribution of demand for banks’ financing itself,
the most significant determinants of sharia banks’ financing in Indonesia are exchange
rate shock (16.40 per cent), supply shock (14.65 per cent), demand shock (10.97 per
cent), business shock (10.89 per cent), and monetary shock (9.41 per cent). Thus, from
macroeconomic point of view, what the Government and Authority agencies can do to
boost the sharia banks’ financing are, for instance, providing a good business environ-
ment, keeping people’s purchasing power high, and also managing a stable exchange rate
performance. Hence, the benefits of sharia banks’ financing will return to the economy
itself accordingly.
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4.4 Historical Decomposition
As shown in Figure 5 to Figure 7, historical decomposition analysis aims to investigate
the contribution of sharia banks’ financing to each of macroeconomic variables over time
(2006q3 to 2017q1). Meanwhile, the shocks that drive sharia banks financing during the
time period are indicated in Figure 6.
To the GDP growth, sharia banks’ financing had negative contribution before the
global financial crisis in 2008, but then it contributed positively after the global financial
crisis period, from 2009q3 to 2013q4. Since 2014q2 until 2017q1, sharia banks’ financing
had a negative contribution to the GDP growth. Along the period of sample (2006q3 to
2017q1), the GDP growth was dominantly determined by supply shocks (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Contribution to GDP Growth
To the core inflation which is commonly associated with people’s purchasing power,
sharia banks’ financing also had negative contribution before the global financial crisis in
2008, but then contributed positively after the global financial crisis period, from 2009q3
to 2014q2. Since 2014q4 until 2017q1, sharia banks’ financing had a negative contribution
to the core inflation as sharia banks’ financing fell during the period. Along the period
of sample (2006q3 to 2017q1), the core inflation was dominantly determined by demand
shocks (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Contribution to Core Inflation
To the business activity, sharia banks’ financing also had a little negative contribution
before the global financial crisis in 2008, but then contributed positively after the global
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financial crisis period, from 2009q2 to 2012q1. Yet, after fluctuating during 2012q3 to
2013q3, sharia banks’ financing had a negative contribution to business activity again
from 2013q4 until 2016q1. Along the period of sample (2006q3 to 2017q1), the business
activity was dominantly determined by business shocks and exchange rate shocks (see
Figure 7).
Figure 7: Contribution to Business Activity
Meanwhile, Figure 8 displays the shocks that drive sharia banks’ financing along the
time period. Before the global financial crisis in 2008, monetary shock had positive
contribution to the sharia banks’ financing, which makes it surpass the baseline during
2007q3 to 2008q3. In 2008q4, however, sharia financing plunged away from its baseline
because of exchange rate shock, which resulted from the global shock.
Between 2010q1 to 2011q4, sharia banks’ financing grew above its baseline due to
positive sharia financing shock itself, positive supply shock, and positive exchange rate
shock, beating negative monetary shock. During this period, sharia banks’ financing
looked unaffected by monetary policy tightening. Nonetheless, from the period of 2014q1
to 2017q1, sharia banks’ financing again grew below its baseline for a relatively long
period of time due to low demands for sharia financing, negative exchange rate shock
as well as negative supply and business shocks. The weak demand shock also played an
important role during the period.
Figure 8: Contribution to Sharia Banks Financing
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5 Summary and Conclusion
In the short-run, the contribution of sharia banks’ financing to the macroeconomic vari-
ables is positive, albeit limited. Yet, it then escalates in the long-run with the main
channel of transmission through its ability to drive people’s purchasing power. Another
important finding was that sharia banks financing in Indonesia was elastic to the mon-
etary policy changes. Similar to the conventional banks’ credit, when the interest rates
tighten, the sharia banks’ financing falls. It shows that the sharia and the conventional
banks share the same business process, which results in a very similar behavior.
Other findings reveal that in the short-run, sharia financing shock itself and exchange
rate shock dominate sharia banks’ financing. It is quite normal that sharia banks’ fi-
nancing really depends on its demand, while the significant contribution of exchange
rate shock reveals that sharia banks are vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations. In
order to improve the performance of sharia banking in Indonesia, the domestic financ-
ing demands have to be strengthened with regards to the large number of Moslems in
Indonesia. At the same time, Islamic banks have to improve their business processes.
Rather than capping their profit margins or murabahah-based financing, they should
promote more profit sharing mudharabah-based financing with prioritizing principle of
mutual help among Moslems. Nevertheless, there were still some drawbacks in this study,
one of which is the strong assumption of recursive short-run restrictions applied in the
SVAR model. Another identified strategy, such as applying long-run restrictions or sign
restrictions may give better estimates indeed.
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